The fragmentation of phenomenal character

Abstract

AbstractIn this paper, I argue that debates over “phenomenal character” have suffered from fragmentation: philosophers who use the term have had in mind at least three (and probably more) radically different kinds of properties. This has occurred because the expression “what it’s like” exhibits a particularly deep form of context‐sensitivity, and when this expression has been used to define phenomenal character, at least three very different contexts have been operating in the background. I then identify four important applications of this idea. First, there is a serious error in an important argument for skepticism about the hard problems of consciousness. Second, contrary to a common line of thought, Nagel’s “what it’s like” characterization of consciousness is not trivial, and is in fact very plausible. Third, an influential naïve realist argument against representationalism rests on a misunderstanding. Finally, and most excitingly, it is possible and indeed very attractive – for representationalists and naïve realists alike – to hold that a veridical perception and a matching hallucination are exactly the same with respect to one kind of phenomenal character, while being radically different with respect to another kind of phenomenal character.