Abstract
AbstractThis chapter examines Kant’s diagnosis of the fourth paralogism. This paralogism argues for the differential certainty of our knowledge of external objects, on the one hand, and our knowledge of our own existence, on the other. The chapter argues that the paralogism does not wear its equivocal middle term, ‘existence outside us’, on its sleeve. An effort is made to reformulate the paralogism so that this phrase can be seen to be the true locus of the equivocation. The chapter then goes on to discuss a range of related issues, including: anti-materialism, monism, Kant’s rejection of external-world scepticism, and the role played by transcendental illusion in encouraging the paralogism. The chapter closes with some reflections on architectonic and method as these topics relate to the Paralogisms.
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