Abstract
This paper is written from a perspective that is sympathetic to the basic idea of the capability approach. Our aim is to compare Martha Nussbaum’s capability theory of justice with Alan Gewirth’s moral theory, on two points: the selection and the justification of a list of central capabilities. On both counts, we contend that Nussbaum’s theory suffers from flaws that Gewirth’s theory may help to remedy. First, we argue that her notion of a (dignified) human life cannot fulfill the role of a normative criterion that Nussbaum wants it to play in selecting capabilities for her list. Second, we question whether Nussbaum’s method of justification is adequate, discussing both her earlier self-validating argumentative strategy and her more recent adherence to the device of an overlapping consensus. We conclude that both strategies fail to provide the capabilities theory with the firm foundation it requires. Next, we turn to Gewirth’s normative theory and discuss how it can repair these flaws. We show how his theory starts from a fundamental moral principle according to which all agents have rights to the protection of the necessary preconditions of their agency. Gewirth’s justification of this principle is then presented, using a version of a transcendental argument. Finally, we explicitly compare Nussbaum and Gewirth and briefly demonstrate what it would mean for Nussbaum to incorporate Gewirthian elements into her capabilities theory of justice.
Highlights
In the last decade discussions about the capabilities approach have received a lot of attention
We will focus on the, in our eyes, most obvious candidate for such a comparison: her former colleague at the University of Chicago, Alan Gewirth. The similarities between their theories seem stronger than with other prominent contemporary Kantians. Both Nussbaum and Gewirth want to spell out justice in terms of rights and connect this to human dignity; both want to justify universal moral obligations with regard to the protection of those rights; both extend the scope of rights beyond negative rights to include positive rights; both see normative duties as neither directed to the realization of specific goals nor to the maximization of goods or utility, but instead as moral obligations to protect and support the necessary preconditions of human life
This paper is written from a perspective that is sympathetic to the basic idea of the capability approach
Summary
In the last decade discussions about the capabilities approach have received a lot of attention. The similarities between their theories seem stronger than with other prominent contemporary Kantians (like Barbara Herman, Thomas Hill, Christine Korsgaard, Onora O’Neill) Both Nussbaum and Gewirth want to spell out justice in terms of rights and connect this to human dignity; both want to justify universal moral obligations with regard to the protection of those rights; both extend the scope of rights beyond negative rights to include positive rights (to say it in political terms: both are more social-democratic than libertarian); both see normative duties as neither directed to the realization of specific goals nor to the maximization of goods or utility, but instead as moral obligations to protect and support the necessary preconditions of human life. We will be critical of many aspects of Nussbaum’s theory and argue that it can profit from the more explicit discussions about meta-ethical and justificatory assumptions that we find in Gewirth and those authors defending his theory It is worth considering whether Gewirth’s strategy opens up theoretical perspectives that help overcome the shortcomings of the capabilities approach. We explicitly compare Nussbaum and Gewirth and briefly demonstrate what it would mean for Nussbaum to incorporate these Gewirthian elements into her capabilities theory of justice (Section 6)
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