Abstract
We can contrast rationalising explanations of the form S φs because p with those of the form S φs because S believes that p. According the Common Kind View, the two sorts of explanation are the same. The Disjunctive View denies this. This paper sets out to elucidate the sense in which the Common Kind Theorist asserts, but the Disjunctivist denies, that the two explanations are the same. I suggest that, in the light of the distinction between kinds of explanation and particular explanations, the relevant sameness thesis is ambiguous, thus giving us two distinct versions of the Common Kind View. I then argue that the only direct arguments for Disjunctivism available in the literature fail because they only succeed in undermining one version of the Common Kind View. I finish, however, by providing a fresh argument for the Disjunctive View which aims to undermine both versions of its competitor.
Highlights
Agents can act and hold attitudes in response to facts they treat as normative reasons to do so
According to the Disjunctive View, there is an important sense in which the explanation providable using an instance of (¬ψ) is different from the explanation providable using a corresponding instance of (ψ): an explanation of the former variety is in some important sense available at all only if the relevant fact is on the scene
With this clarificatory issue settled, it becomes apparent that the only direct arguments for the Disjunctive View available in the literature fail: if sound, they refute only one version of the Common Kind View
Summary
I begin with some background material. §1.1 presents the basic distinction between good cases and bad cases in terms of which the debate between Disjunctivists and Common Kind Theorists in this area is to be framed. §1.2 makes explicit my commitment to two epistemic claims about the good case which will colour the discussion. §1.3 extends our understanding of good cases and bad cases, in a way that will prove useful, by developing it in a metaphysical direction. §1.4 makes explicit two ways in which the present discussion has limited scope. A corresponding instance of the following psychologistic schema is true where, again, the ‘because’ is a rationalising ‘because’: I’ve said that in the bad case, the agent φs in a way that manifests their belief that p and their treating p as a normative reason for them to φ, so that a (ψ) statement is true of them. All that holds is the neutral condition.
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