The Formula of the End in Itself

Abstract

Commentators have exercised themselves trying to determine what arguments Kant actually deploys for showing the equivalence of this formula to the Formula of Universal Law or the Formula of the Law of Nature. I propose here to present two arguments in the spirit of Kant which are available to Kant or to Kantians in order to derive the Formula of the End in Itself from the standard formulae of the Categorical Imperative and other theses of the Grundlegung. The first argument presents the Formula of the End in Itself as an application of the Formula of Universal Law. Consider the maxim 'When I wish to, I may use other people solely as means'. A man cannot will that this maxim should be a universal law, for this would involve willing that others should use him solely as a means to their ends. But, according to Kant, he necessarily thinks of himself at any rate as rational, as an end-possessing creature, and as therefore unfit to be used as a means only. Accordingly, he cannot will that he should be treated as if he were not what he necessarily is. He cannot, therefore, will that people should be treated as means only and it is hence wrong to use people as means only. If I am correct in thinking that the Formula of the End in Itself is in this way an application of the Formula of Universal Law, we should not regard the former as either stronger than the latter or as independent of it, as some commentators maintain. The second argument is somewhat closer to the actual text of the Grundlegung. The idea behind it is not the one in the text that persons are ends in themselves but that the very existence of good wills is a good end. All action is for the sake of some end and the Categorical Imperative, however formulated, must put an unconditional restriction of some kind on what ends we should pursue. Now a good will is a will