Abstract
As a discipline, logic is arguably constituted of two main sub-projects: formal theories of argument validity on the basis of a small number of patterns, and theories of how to reduce the multiplicity of arguments in non-logical, informal contexts to the small number of patterns whose validity is systematically studied (i.e. theories of formalization). Regrettably, we now tend to view logic 'proper' exclusively as what falls under the first sub-project, to the neglect of the second, equally important sub-project. In this paper, I discuss two historical theories of argument formalization: Aristotle's syllogistic theory as presented in the "Prior Analytics", and medieval theories of supposition. They both illustrate this two-fold nature of logic, containing in particular illuminating reflections on how to formalize arguments (i.e. the second sub-project). In both cases, the formal methods employed differ from the usual modern technique of translating an argument in ordinary language into a specially designed symbolism, a formal language. The upshot is thus a plea for a broader conceptualization of what it means to formalize.
Highlights
I discuss two historical theories of argument formalization: Aristotle’s syllogistic theory as presented in the “Prior Analytics”, and medieval theories of supposition. They both illustrate the two-fold nature of logic just described, as they contain illuminating reflections on how to formalize arguments in this sense. Before discussing these two theories, I begin with brief considerations on the metaphysics of arguments, which are relevant for a proper philosophical conceptualization of the formalization enterprise
The formal methods employed differ from the usual modern techniques of translating an argument in ordinary language into a specially designed symbolism, a formal language
The process of attributing a syllogistic structure to an arbitrary argument, as we have seen, is arguably a fully-fledged process of formalization, even though the output is a rephrased argument in what can be described as a regimented close counterpart of ordinary language
Summary
Logic is arguably constituted of two main sub-projects: formal theories of argument validity on the basis of a small number of patterns, and theories of how to reduce the multiplicity of arguments in nonlogical, informal contexts to the small number of patterns whose validity is systematically studied (i.e. theories of formalization). the former desperately needs the latter if a logical theory is to have any application at all to ‘real life’ arguments, so we might say that the portion of logical theorizing which concerns the interface between the formal and the informal, so to speak, is perhaps even more fundamental than the purely formal portion. Logic is arguably constituted of two main sub-projects: formal theories of argument validity on the basis of a small number of patterns, and theories of how to reduce the multiplicity of arguments in nonlogical, informal contexts to the small number of patterns whose validity is systematically studied (i.e. theories of formalization).. I discuss two historical theories of argument formalization: Aristotle’s syllogistic theory as presented in the “Prior Analytics”, and medieval theories of supposition They both illustrate the two-fold nature of logic just described, as they contain illuminating reflections on how to formalize arguments in this sense. Before discussing these two theories, I begin with brief considerations on the metaphysics of arguments, which are relevant for a proper philosophical conceptualization of the formalization enterprise
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