The Forgotten Alasdair MacIntyre: Beyond Value Neutrality in the Social Sciences

Abstract

Alasdair MacIntyre is often recognized for his contributions to moral philosophy. In this article, I argue that his reputation should be rehabilitated as a theorist who has realized an essentially critical conception of social science that moves beyond the old dogma of value neutrality. The article’s first section narrates how MacIntyre’s unique conception of a critical social science arose out of debates with Peter Winch, whose defense of value neutrality MacIntyre found untenable. He responded by developing a social science every bit as interpretive as Winch’s, but also inherently critical and normative. The second section explores how MacIntyre’s vision of social science can generate criticism of major approaches to political inquiry today, including mainstream political science, Quentin Skinner’s Cambridge School, and Michel Foucault’s post-structuralism.