The Foreign Policy of the Dependent State

Abstract

This paper probes the process by which the foreign policy orientation of weak nations comes to reflect the preferences of more powerful nations. Two general conceptions of the nature of this process are identified. The most common view, that of the bargaining model, regards the policymaking process of weak states as relatively autonomous though influenced by reward/punishment actions of a more powerful nation which condition the weaker partner. By contrast, the dependency model stresses the long-term character of the influence and the indirect path by which it occurs. It regards the decisionmaking process as imbedded in a social/political structure which is itself distorted by the dependency relationship. Both a cross-sectional and a longitudinal analysis relying upon UN voting data and measures of the relations between the United States and 88 less-developed nations indicate that the explanatory power of the bargaining model is relatively limited and that the dependency model is a more appropriate conception. Though cross-sectionally, both reward behavior (various forms of aid) and dependency-indicating transactions (e.g. treaties, trade, arms sales, IGO memberships, consultations, etc.) exhibit correlations with voting behavior, those of the latter are generally considerably stronger. Further, longitudinal analysis exposes much greater stability in voting behavior over time—and much less correlation with aid-giving—than one would expect if bargaining were present. This stable pro-American behavior is precisely that which would be predicted by a theory resting upon long-term distortions implicit in an enduring and penetrating structural relationship.