The Forces of Law

Abstract

Abstract This chapter argues that the force of law is the sum of three different forces: the imposition of duties, the provision of coercion, and the exercise of power. Contemporary jurisprudence has shown that coercion is central to law in important ways, even though coercion is not part of the concept of law. Frederick Schauer accepts the truth but not the importance of this claim. He thinks the central fact worth knowing about law is that it makes people do things they would not otherwise want to do, and insists that people act in accordance with its wishes. The chapter responds along two fronts. First, Schauer underestimates the role coercion plays even in the theories of writers like H. L. A. Hart or Ronald Dworkin. Second, his concept of coercion is too broad: it includes as ‘coercive’ almost every law-caused change to behaviour. Jurisprudence needs to distinguish coercion, power, and duties. These can, but need not, be present together. Disentangling them requires conceptual analysis: we cannot count how much coercion goes on in law until we know what counts as coercion.