Abstract
The difference in the effects on public expenditure by local governments of consumer's incomes and intergovernmental grants is shown to be consistent with the maximization of a representative consumer's utility by a local government. Increasing marginal deadweight loss of taxation accounts for the result. Explanations of the flypaper effect do not therefore require models of strategic bureaucratic behavior or voter misperceptions.
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