The Fixed-term Parliaments Act and Votes of Confidence

Philip Norton

doi:10.1093/pa/gsv003

Abstract

The Government in the UK rests for its continuation in office on the confidence of the House of Commons. Until 2011, it was a convention of the constitution that a Government defeated on a motion of confidence resigned or requested the dissolution of Parliament. There were different categories of confidence votes. The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 puts on a statutory basis the conditions for a general election following the loss of an explicitly worded motion of no confidence. Although not intended to do so initially, the provisions of the Act limit the options available to the Prime Minister in the event of a vote of no confidence and in so doing removed a significant power to maximise parliamentary strength in key votes.

Highlights

In parliamentary systems of government, the executive normally rests on the confidence of the legislature for its continuance in office
The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 modified the consequences of the House of Commons expressing its lack of confidence in the Government
We analyse how this outcome was arrived at. It was the result of the distinctive basis of the convention governing votes of confidence in the UK, the formation of a coalition Government and a failure on the part of those negotiating the coalition agreement to appreciate the nature of the convention

Summary

Introduction

In parliamentary systems of government, the executive normally rests on the confidence of the legislature for its continuance in office. The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 modified the consequences of the House of Commons expressing its lack of confidence in the Government. The Act has notable consequences for Government, not least in removing the option available to the Prime Minister to maximise voting loyalty on the part of Government backbenchers; that is, by designating a vote as one of confidence, defeat on which would precipitate a general election. It was an option rarely employed, but its availability was a powerful weapon – the parliamentary nuclear option – in the Prime Minister’s arsenal. But nothing to match the immediacy and impact of triggering a general election

The significance of parliamentary confidence

The Fixed-term Parliaments Act

Findings

Consequences 14