The Fiscal-Electoral Nexus in Australia, 1976-94

Abstract

This article re-evaluates existing political business cycle theory in the specific context of the political economy of Australian fiscal policy since the mid-1970s. Whereas 'traditional' political business cycle models, formulated within a Keynesian framework, assume a high level of state autonomy over fiscal policy, this article argues that an environment of fiscal restraint has been imposed on Australian federal governments over the study period. Given the historical dynamics of Australian economic policy which inform this study, a hypothesis is developed which reflects the policy optimisation dilemma which has confronted Australian federal governments when formulating fiscal priorities in a pre-election context. On one hand, there are pre-poll demands for expansionary fiscal settings from the electorate; on the other, there are demands from financial markets and domestic neoliberal interests for fiscal restraint. Reflecting the fact that identifiable costs are associated with implementing expansionary fiscal policy settings, it is hypothesised that such an approach will be adopted only in times of greatest political need, when an incumbent government is facing a popularity deficit in a pre-election context. While the study confirms that the fiscal-electoral effect is relatively weak, electoral demands do still influence the fiscal priorities of Australian federal governments. This is particularly so with the case of personal taxation relief, a policy approach that appears to be more acceptable to financial markets, key neoliberal interests and some segments of the electorate.