The First-Person Standpoint of Fichte’s Ethics

Abstract

We live in exciting times - a generalization that can be extended contemporary philosophy, and particularly contemporary work in ethics. Not only is shop-worn debate between deontologists and utilitarians no longer only game in town, with rise of such vigorous competitors as and an of care, but traditional giants in this field are being creatively reinterpreted as well, as is indicated by spate of recent efforts at systematic rapprochement between, say, Kantian and Aristotelian ethics. One noteworthy contribution this renaissance of creative ethical thinking is represented by Stephen Darwall's efforts construct a new account of moral obligation from what he calls in his 2006 book of same name the standpoint.1 Darwall's account is based upon a careful and ingenious analysis of peculiar normative force of so-called second-person which are kind of reasons that can be addressed only by one person another, and which count as reasons only because both parties recognize practical authority of other make certain demands simply by virtue of his or her dignity as a person. That is say, recognize such a reason at all is presuppose authority of other address one in this way. As Darwall puts it: to enter intelligibly into stance and make claims on and demands of one another at all, you and I must presuppose that we share a common second-personal authority, competence, and responsibility simply as free and rational agents.2 Darwall's claim is that moral obligation is ultimately based upon such an appeal such reasons, and thus he offers a new and in many ways compelling theory of ethics from a secondperson a theory which he is able apply creatively an impressive number of traditional puzzles in moral philosophy. It is not my intention on this occasion explore, explicate, or criticize Darwall's ethics. Instead, I will be focusing upon a relatively minor feature of his exposition of his position: namely, his repeated claim that his new ethical theory is, in fact, anticipated by and some degree based upon that of J. G. Fichte. This claim is stated in chapter 10 of Darwall's book, Dignity and Second Person: Variations on Fichtean Themes, and is defended in more detail in his contribution 2005 issue of International Yearbookfor German Idealism, in an essay titled and Second-Person Standpoint.3 In responding Darwall's claims, I find myself in a somewhat ticklish situation: On one hand, I sincerely admire his efforts construct an ethics from a standpoint, and I also salute him for trying reanimate one of most original ideas (that is, his theory of intersubjective recognition by way of a summons, which Darwall calls Fichte's Point) and connect it so directly concerns of contemporary philosophy. And I readily concede that ethical theory can profit from a new examination of secondperson and an investigation of presuppositions of same. On other hand, as a self-designated Fichte scholar, I feel that it is my somewhat unhappy duty point out that kind of ethical theory Darwall envisions bears little relation indeed own but instead imports arguments from philosophy of right or system of natural law into - for Fichte at least - very different realm of ethics, while resolutely ignoring own ethical theory. I will therefore begin my remarks by contrasting genuinely standpoint of philosophy of law or civil justice (Recht) propounded by Fichte in his 1796/97 Grundlage des Naturrechts with what he himself insists is very different standpoint of moral philosophy expounded in his 1798 System der Sittenlehre. And then, in second part of this essay, I will provide a brief exegesis of one of main lines of argument from Part I of Sittenlehre, an exegesis intended demonstrate that resolutely first-person standpoint of latter. …