The First Person Singular

Abstract

Insight in the First Person SingularEdmund Husserl, a professional mathematician, insisted that all knowledge originates in intuitions in the first person singular. In insight something is before the mind as an object, and completely present. I see at once what the number four or a straight line is. Mathematical calculus proceeds by substitution and combination, which can be done by a computer. But at the conclusion of a mathematical or logical demonstration I see that it follows, that it is valid. The formula can then be used in subsequent demonstrations without reenacting the intuition; it can be used as a known element in a calculus. Similarly in empirical knowledge: at the origin I see that water boils at 100°C; thereafter, retained in linguistic and mathematical symbols, I or anyone can use the formula without reactivating the intuition. The linguistic and mathematical symbols in which I record my observation do not originate with me; they preexist me and are anonymous. Husserl argued that to verify the soundness of our mathematics, logic, and natural sciences, as well as to advance them, we have to reactivate the original intuitions.Martin Heidegger modified this task in three ways. He replaced the substantive account of the environment about us with a relational account. We are not confronted with an array of things fully present in their places and supporting themselves in their own existence. Things are in dynamic relations with other things. They support and are supported by other things and resist the forces of other things. We perceive things by approaching them and manipulating them; it is to perceive what we can do with them. From the start things are perceived as paths, objectives, obstacles, implements. To perceive something is to perceive it in relation to its setting, its possibilities, and our powers. Similarly, to see what the number 4, or a logical premise is, is to see how it can function within the arithmetical or logical system.Once I have seen what something is, I do not reactivate that insight all over again each time; I glance lightly at it and use it as a readymade unit in my practical survey and calculative thinking. I formulate it in words that are repeatable.Second modification of Husserl's analysis: In fact the insights come second. Our sensory-motor bodies are from the first activated by others. I have picked up from others how to focus my eyes on things, how to advance toward them and manipulate them. What I call things and how I appraise them and how I plan and judge operations I have picked up from others. Words, phrases, assertions can be picked up from others, passed on to others because they formulate not the concrete lines of individual things and events, but the general lines of things and events that recur. Speech acts circulate without our reactivating the insights into their validity.Third modification: Things that present themselves in our environment present possibilities. A green thing looks like it will continue to be green. A green thing can turn other surfaces, may be bleached by the high noon sun, darkened with shadow. What is possible is not simply not yet there; it is possibly impossible. Heidegger argues that this sense of impossibility is not simply a conceptual construct. It enters into my perception of my environment. The things about me look contingent, foreshadowing futures that are possibly impossible. Indeed the entire environment I perceive appears contingent, its continuation possibly impossible.Insight into ImpossibilityThe sense of the contingency of things about me and the contingency of my environment, comes with, and out of, Heidegger argues, the sense that I am contingent, that my continued existence in the environment is possibly impossible. An implement may splinter, electrocute, or poison the water or the air, the car heading toward me may abruptly swerve and crash into me, the meat I buy in the market may contain toxins or viruses. …