Abstract

Resource dependence theory posits that interorganizational cooperation is a key means of reducing uncertainty and ensuring survival, but little research to date has investigated how coalitions of organizations reduce uncertainty and ensure survival, both for the coalition and the member institutions. In this research, we explore how relative bargaining power and legitimacy impact the structure and performance of coalitions. We analyze fifteen years of coalition realignment and performance among college football conferences. Using a comparative case study approach, we find that relative bargaining power and legitimacy have different implications for strong and weak conferences, and that those differences in power and legitimacy drive different performance orientations and outcomes. This results in a paradigm where the most powerful coalitions can ensure the greatest performance and exert the highest amount of autonomy with the least amount of restraints on member organizations.

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