The Finnish Presidency: Efficiency Before Eloquence?

Abstract

At the conclusion of the second Finnish presidency of the European Union (EU) in the second half of 2006, the Finnish Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja noted that the Presidency had consisted of 65 per cent unforeseen events and 35 per cent anticipated events; and overall, it had been more successful with the former than the latter (Tuomioja, 2007). There are several reasons for such a surprising conclusion. Above all, some of important issues like the services directive, REACH and the EU Battle Groups had been largely agreed prior to the Finnish presidency. Therefore, the ambitions on the legislative front and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) were not particularly high. Due to the expiration of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) with Russia and the fact that that relations with Russia is a special field of interest and expertise of Finland, the presidency’s main efforts concentrated on concluding the mandate for the negotiations on the PCA. However, these efforts were impeded by the dispute between Poland and Russia on meat imports (see Allen and Smith, this volume). Another anticipated item on the agenda, enlargement, proved to be more strenuous than before.Against this background it can be said that the successful handling of the unexpected war in Lebanon ‘saved’ the Finnish presidency and it can be considered a ‘successful’ presidency. The Finnish presidency would appear as one in which political leadership was the most prominent in sudden crises and least prominent in issues EU’s on the long-term agenda. JCMS 2007 Volume 45 Annual Review pp. 17–24