Abstract
ABSTRACTIn June 1944 the Red Army achieved a strategic surprise on the Karelian Isthmus although Finnish forces had previously made several observations indicative of an attack. The paper presents a number of drivers underlying the Finnish intelligence failure. First, Soviet forces succeeded in concealing the extent of the build-up, causing defenders to underestimate the size of opposing forces. Second, Finnish military intelligence suffered from fragmented collection and analysis. Third, military decision-makers failed to understand the significance of Soviet preparations and Soviet tactical improvements due to a combination of situational constraints, group processes, and organizational stagnation. These generated a predominant view that within the limited options available, sufficient preparations had been made to repel a potential Soviet attack on the Karelian Isthmus.
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