The Finite and the Infinite in Lukács and Hegel

Abstract

The argument in Lukács: Praxis and the Absolute (López, 2019) suggests that Lukács’ attempt to supersede Hegel failed. Ironically, Lukács’ concept of praxis reproduces the logical structure of Hegel's bad infinity, concealing its own finite historical origins in October 1917 (and Lukács’ philosophical reflection thereupon) while also mystifying the conceptual-logical content of praxis itself. In short, Lukács’ concept of praxis is a mythology that relapses into the antinomies he identified and criticized in others. If Lukács’ philosophy of praxis is critically reconstructed in light of Hegel's speculative understanding of the infinite and the finite, Lukács’ concept of praxis may be recovered and reconstituted on a more rational basis. The resulting speculative concept of praxis makes it possible to overcome the interrelated pitfalls of nihilism and dogmatic positivity that Lukács referred to via Heraclitus. Further, this will assist the development of a more reflective, critical Marxist Hegelian concept of praxis that may better orient socialist practice and contribute to the reformation of Marxism that Gillian Rose called for in Hegel Contra Sociology (Rose, 2009).