Abstract

Security Council Resolution 2249 of 20 November 2015 was intended to open a new chapter in the fight against terrorism in general and against ISIS in particular. However, in academia this Resolution was received with criticism. After an analysis of SC Resolution 2249, it will be argued that the criteria developed for assessing jus ad bellum in inter-state relations are of no easy application in the relationship between states and non-state actors and in particular in regard to terrorists. If the prohibition of the use of force applies at all, this has to happen in a largely modified way. Fears that a lowered threshold for the use of force against terrorists will introduce a new “Hobbesian” element in international law do not appear to be justified. On the contrary, an international community showing more solidarity in the fight against terrorism will reinforce their Kantian traits. Resolution 2249 can offer an important contribution for such a development to take place.

Highlights

  • There are few United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions that received so much public attention as did the Resolution 2249 of 20 November 2015 on the fight against the Islamic State.[1]

  • Security Council Resolution 2249 of 20 November 2015 was intended to open a new chapter in the fight against terrorism in general and against ISIS in particular

  • It will be argued that the criteria for the use of force developed for the interstate context only partly apply to the field of international anti-terrorism law

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Summary

Introduction

There are few United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions that received so much public attention as did the Resolution 2249 of 20 November 2015 on the fight against the Islamic State.[1]. While UNSC Resolution 2249 was considered by many lawyers as vague it is argued here that this Resolution can be seen as an important clarifying instrument with regard to the limits of forceful action against terrorism. It will be argued that the criteria for the use of force developed for the interstate context only partly apply to the field of international anti-terrorism law. Are we regressing to a Hobbesian international legal order under the pressure of ever more violent terrorist attacks that compel us to take recourse to force? It will be argued that UNSC Resolution 2249, notwithstanding the licence to take recourse to force it furnishes, represents no reversal towards a Hobbesian order. If engaged in proper ways, this challenge can offer the international legal community the opportunity to become even more resilient and peaceful

Framing the issue
UNSC Resolution 2249 and the right to self-defence
The specific characteristics of self-defence against terrorism
Conclusions: moving from a Hobbesian perspective to a Kantian one
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