The ‘Fifth Column’ and the British Experience of Retreat, 1940

Abstract

Fear of the ‘Fifth Column’ was one of the most important aspects of the defeat suffered by the British army in France and Belgium during May and June 1940, but it has so far been largely overlooked in most accounts of the campaign. There was widespread paranoia throughout the British Expeditionary Force that its efforts were being undermined by spies, traitors and saboteurs, all working behind the lines to deliver a fatal ‘stab in the back’ to British forces. This paper suggests that this feature of the experience of retreat is a fundamental issue. It argues that many of the other notable facets of the retreat - the strained relationship with allies, the problems in dealing with civilians, the deterioration of morale - can be better understood within the context of the widespread fear of the ‘Fifth Column’. Furthermore, it argues that there was a disintegration and brutalization of relationships with civilians, refugees and allies as a direct result of ‘Fifth Column’ paranoia. It concludes that although the actual influence of any Fifth Column was probably insignificant, the British army suffered far greater damage from the phantom menace of its imaginary ‘Fifth Column’.