The Fictitious Liberal Divide

Åsbjørn Melkevik

doi:10.23941/ejpe.v10i2.287

Abstract

The main question dividing classical and high liberals is about how economic rights rank compared to other rights and public goals. That is, the question is about what can or cannot outweigh such rights. High liberals argue that economic rights can be outweighed by any legitimate state interest, such that they are prima facie rights. Neoclassical liberals, conversely, have recently sought to elevate economic rights to basic rights, which could then only be outweighed by other basic rights. This paper shows where the real debate should be for classical liberals, challenging Samuel Freeman’s widely held distinction between classical and high liberalism. Economic rights are prima facie for all liberals in that they can be outweighed by, say, considerations of utility or social justice. Although neoclassical liberals are correct to say that such rights are much more important than high liberals normally recognize, it does not follow that economic rights are basic.

Highlights

The main question dividing classical and high liberals is about how economic rights rank compared to other rights and public goals
There is no real disagreement in the liberal tradition concerning the nature and the justification of economic rights, as both classical and high liberals agree that economic rights may be limited so as to pursue some other aspects of justice or utility, and they both understand such rights as essential components of a system of ordered liberty
If there is any disagreement, it comes from some neoclassical liberals who are most probably misrepresenting their own understanding of economic rights by calling such rights basic

Summary

ARE ECONOMIC RIGHTS BASIC ACCORDING TO CLASSICAL LIBERALS?

It is common to assume that the core disagreement between classical and high liberals concerns the harmonization of economic rights with a theory of justice. Neoclassical liberals, like John Tomasi (2012, 42), Jason Brennan (2012), and Daniel Shapiro (1995a), have argued that economic rights are basic in the classical liberal tradition. There is no real disagreement about the nature of economic rights within the liberal tradition.1 Both classical and high liberals, I argue, share the same understanding of economic rights as prima facie rights, not as basic rights as defined by Rawls. Contrary to what many defend, following Freeman, economic rights have never been basic in the classical liberal tradition Both classical and high liberals understand economic rights as prima facie, which means that they can be outweighed by considerations of utility or social justice. The paper concludes by arguing that the only difference between classical and high liberals concerns the strength of the reasons required to outweigh economic rights

THE DIVERSITY ARGUMENT FOR ECONOMIC RIGHTS BEING BASIC

THREE WAYS TO UNDERSTAND THE LIBERAL DIVIDE ON ECONOMIC

Findings

CONCLUSION—ECONOMIC RIGHTS ARE NOT BASIC FOR LIBERALS