The feasibility of a developmental cognitive science: A response to Pea and Kurland

Abstract

(;omputer use in education has been driven blindly forward amidst mixed enthusiasm and anxiety from parents and schools, and amidst extravagant promises of forthcoming educational benefits. In the context of this uncritical rush for computation, Pea and Kurland’s reasoned argument for a measure of clearheadedness is most persuasive. They are correct in pointing out that much current research on cognitive gains from computer use has been purely anecdotal. On the other hand, this is not necessarily a deplorable order of events, since early anecdotal claims can provide important hypotheses for more methodologically rigorous work of the kind outlined in the Pea and Kurland paper. In addition, it is important to be clear that methodological rigor will not in itself prefabricate and deliver the Solid-Truth-of-the-Matter into the eager hands of parents, teachers, administrators, and policy makers. However we see these effects, they will always be defined by the way in which we choose to look. However, it is time to look more critically. In addition, there are compelling reasons for being attracted to Pea and Kurland’s proposed merger of developmental psychology and cognitive science for the purpose of studying the educational use of the information technologies. In fact, the integration of these approaches is precisely what is needed within the computers-in-edilcatiorl field at this time. On the other hand, as I shall argue, I am far less convinced than Pea and Kurland that this merger is readily accomplishable, or that is constitutes a new idea in psychology with enhanced power for explaining learning. Why does this merger seem so intuitively reasonable ? For its part, cognitive science provides a language tbr explicitly and minutely describing cognitive change within a particular context and a particular content domain. Both its ability to describe process and its specificity are attractive to researchers interested in learning. Because they have no theoretical reason for applJ%lg general labels to processes which may work quite differently under dif‘ferent conditions, cognitive scientists can avoid the trap of’ claiming that a person who behaves in a certain way has demonstrated competence in some generalizable complex cognitive skill, which must, therefore, be identifiable in new domains. Cognitive science can thus sidestep questions of the form, “Does programming teach problem solving?” in favor of questions like, “Which individuals, with what