"The Fear of the Dog"

Abstract

IntroductionThere is something inevitable about raising question within context of Levinas studies. Levinas, after all, is a critical figure in twentieth-century phenomenology and Continental philosophy, and a pioneer of twentieth-century Continental ethics. He is thinker of suffering, of hunger, and of mortal exposure as they contribute to meaning of ethical and as they give concrete significance to ethical imperative. And where such phenomena as suffering and hunger are at play, question of is shortly to follow, since at least some non-human animals have a claim to at least some of these ethically significant experiences. It is not surprising, then, question of is of concern within Levinas studies, nor a great deal of attention is paid to whether Levinas's philosophy can be a resource for developing more responsible and compassionate approaches toward non-human animals.Disagreement in scholarly debates frequently centers upon whether Levinas's anthropocentric focus is a constitutive feature of his philosophy, or if instead it represents a failure on his part to live up to implications of his own philosophical commitments.1 Rather than entering into this dispute directly, I would like to shift our focus toward what I see as a fundamental tension within Levinas's thought having to do with his use of narrative, image, and metaphor as integral features of his philosophy. In this regard, my approach segues with contemporary debates within and beyond Levinas studies interrogate category of as a figure of rhetoric. Indeed, it is not only in what Levinas says about non-human animals directly, but in ways he uses animals rhetorically, fate of is decided in his philosophy.It is worth noting the animal is a problematic locution vis-a-vis actual animals (a category might otherwise include human beings), and it has been put in question by several thinkers within Continental tradition who also read Levinas. In The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow) Derrida remarks concept of the animal is radically inadequate to range of beings it presumably names, and this is case despite concept's ubiquity in humanist discourse. There is an immense multiplicity of other living things writes Derrida, that cannot in any way be homogenized, except by means of violence and willful ignorance, within category of what is called or animality in general2 Likewise, in an interview published under title 'Eating Well,' or Calculation of Subject Derrida explores way in which concepts such as plant, or stone have a constitutive relationship to modern notion of the subject and can take shape so as to engender exclusionary forms of ethics and politics.3In a similar vein, Kelly Oliver argues failure on part of those who advocate for rights to critically analyze category of profoundly limits their effectiveness. Oliver writes:[F]ocusing on rights or equality and extending them to animals does not address more essential issues of conceptions of man, or human. It does not challenge presumptions of humanism make man measure of all things, including other animals and earth. Insofar as it leaves intact traditional concepts of man and and traditional values associated with them, it cannot transform our ways of thinking about either.4To interrogate figure of the animal, or figure of certain kinds of animals (the wolf, fox), is thus integral to any substantive intervention into long history of humanist discourse. If to be deserving of rights has historically meant one must qualify as a human being, and if to be human is to be 'not-animal' then non-human animals may be excluded from domain of rights-bearing individuals from start. …