The FDNY on 9/11: Information and decision making in crisis

Abstract

Abstract This article reviews and analyzes the essential lessons in the New York City Fire Department's use of information on 9/11/01. It draws heavily on an oral history archive compiled by the Department after the event but withheld until 2005 and released then only under court order. Analysis of the interviews shows that coordination and communication were serious problems; securing information early in the emergency was difficult; commanders lacked solid information to direct efforts; information was contradictory and difficult to interpret; the collapse of the WTC towers was difficult to conceptualize; improvisation was common; and false information compounded confusion. The oral history archive also offers insight into the information-processing and decision-making processes of commanders and front-line responders. The oral histories were useful in FDNY analysis of performance on that critical day but they do not provide definitive answers to critical questions such as the timeliness of the order to evacuate the towers. The use of information on 9/11 also provides other insights into the optimal use of information by emergency service departments.