Abstract

It is argued that domestic intelligence operations in the Hoover FBI served essentially organizational and public relations functions for the Bureau. The Hoover FBI's unique position in the federal government was a direct result of its domestic intelligence responsibilities and the particular way internal security concerns were used for ends self-serv ing to the organization. The disparity between the Bureau's carefully cultivated image as a fighter of enemies of the state and its domestic intelligence performance was not revealed until the late 1960s, when the Nixon Administration became dissatisfied with the Bureau's in ability to anticipate the plans of domestic dissenters. This dissatisfac tion culminated in the Huston Plan of 1970. The real "failure" of FBI domestic intelligence under Hoover appears to be that it did not pro duce useful information for anticipating and managing dissent. The "new" FBI which has emerged in the post-Watergate era has been careful to dissociate itself from the abuses of the Hoover era. It is pointed out that the "reform" of domestic intelligence which has taken place has been largely administrative and internal to the ex ecutive branch. The reform has not been designed primarily to pro hibit past abuses, but rather to ensure executive control of intelligence operations. A reconstituted Bureau with domestic intelligence opera tions centrally guided and coordinated by the executive, and with few external checks and balances because of national security concerns, could pose a greater threat to civil liberties than did the Hoover Bu reau.

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