The farce of the commons? Corporate rights, political wrongs and common-pool resources in English towns, 1835–1870

Abstract

ABSTRACT The 1832 Reform Act and the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act reconfigured political representation in English towns from a ‘franchise’ system (based on rights of corporate freedom) to a property-based ratepaying electorate. This shift also undermined the rights of freemen to urban common lands and resources, which were linked to pre-existing forms of representation. This issue links directly to debates in economic history about use-rights and the preservation of common-pool resources (CPRs). Supporters of Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom argue that such common resources could be preserved because this was the most rational economic choice facing their users. Critics have asserted that the fate of such economic resources was dictated by the historically contingent social, economic and political forces within them, not abstract economic rationality. This article assesses these arguments through a micro-study of the commons in the Yorkshire borough of Beverley between 1835 and 1870. New legislation ensured that these lands were managed in line with Ostrom’s principles of transparency and accountability. Despite this, they became entangled in wholesale, organised political corruption, exposed by a detailed Parliamentary enquiry in 1868. The article investigates this contradiction to explore how far ‘institutions’ could remain autonomous within a highly contested political ‘space’.