The failure of police ‘fusion’ centers and the concept of a national intelligence sharing plan

Abstract

The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) originated primarily in response to the September 11 attacks with the intended goal of improving the coordination of law enforcement agencies through better mechanisms of intelligence sharing. These mechanisms have taken form as fusion centers whereby information is collected, stored, analyzed, converted into intelligence, and subsequently disseminated to other agencies. According to the NCISP, local fusion centers report to state fusion centers that ultimately report to the National Counter Terrorism Center for a coordinated response to potential criminal and terrorist threats. Though well-intentioned, there is very little evidence to suggest that the goals of improved communication and coordination have been accomplished through the NCISP or fusion centers. The authors argue that the structure and mission of law enforcement agencies undermines the very essence of fusion centers and what they are intended to do. In particular, agencies still possess a number of traits (e.g., autonomy and interagency ego) that hinder the effective and efficient sharing of information and intelligence. Moreover, local agencies operating fusion centers are required to assume roles, strategies, and techniques inherent to the military and federal law enforcement operations. These issues are reviewed and recommendations are discussed for future applications of fusion centers.