The Failure of Nozick's Invisible-Hand Justification of the Political State

Abstract

In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick contends that the question of political philosophy is whether there should be a political state at all. Why not, he asks, have anarchy?1 This is a serious question which, he insists, demands consideration prior to any discussion of the proper structure of a political state. State of nature theory provides, in Nozick's estimation, the most profitable starting point for addressing the question of anarchy. In fact, he perceives a two-fold purpose in state of nature theory, the first justificatory, the second explanatory. In its justificatory role, state of nature theory establishes that if one can demonstrate that a political state (a) would be superior to the best situation of anarchy (i.e., state of nature) 2 which can reasonably be hoped for, (b) would come into being without taking any morally impermissible steps, that is, without violating anyone's natural rights, or (c) would be an improvement over the state of nature, then formation of a political state is justified.3 The explanatory purpose of state of nature theory relates to what Nozick calls a fundamental explanation of (a| realm.4 Such an explanation is valuable because it explains the realm in terms of its most basic, important, and unavoidable features. Hence, he maintains that if one can explain the political realm in terms of the nonpolitical (the state of nature), then one has achieved the most desirable and complete explanation of the political realm possible. The plausibility of Nozick's admittedly libertarian 5 political philosophy thus turns in large part upon the state of nature which undergirds it. In this paper 1 suggest that shortcomings in his formulation of that state of nature undermine his political theory's credibility. In particular, I argue that the state of nature he conceives rests upon two