The Failure of Gambetta's Grand Ministere

Abstract

Leon Gambetta's appointment to the presidency of the council of ministers early in November 1881 aroused great expectations. With his popular appeal and parliamentary following Gambetta, and only Gambetta, had enough authority to control an increasingly divided and unruly chamber. Nevertheless, the very government that was expected to endure proved to be the most ephemeral of all. After a scant two and one-half months Gambetta fell before a disparate coalition of radical republicans, monarcho-Bonapartist conservatives, and disgruntled moderates. Depending on their perspective, contemporaries blamed Gambetta's defeat either on his drive for personal power or on the recalcitrance of a Chamber hostile to executive authority.1 Either way they considered the defeat of the Gambetta ministry the casualty of a wider conflict between strong ministerial leadership and parliamentary autonomy, and with good reason. Gambetta had indeed taken power expecting to end the succession of weak cabinets directed by men without significant authority. He intended to develop a dependable majority closely bound to the cabinet. Originally most deputies understood and accepted Gambetta's political objectives, but for reasons that have remained obscure Gambetta's political reform attempts turned into a bitter struggle for power, won by the Chamber. Gambetta began with significant strikes against him, and he magnified his problems by adopting a belligerent stand that transformed his reform designs into a confrontation and a test of wills. Gambetta had been excluded from the prime ministership he deserved as leader