The Factional Logic of Political Protection in Authoritarian Regimes

Abstract

Existing literature highlights an authoritarian sanction dilemma: Dictators must deter rent-seeking, yet in doing so they risk antagonizing factional allies. Using a new dataset of disciplinary investigations within the Chinese and Vietnamese Communist Party, I show that some dictators navigate this dilemma by tailoring the political protection they provide to their followers. Factional malleability, the extent to which a regime’s factions are formed around mutable personal connections, moderates the choice of protection method. In China, where factions are rigid, factional allies’ defection threat is non-credible. Thus, the dictator offers ex post protection, which is more desirable to him than to his subordinates, by giving delayed, lenient punishments to investigated officials in factionally-connected provinces. In contrast, under Vietnam’s malleable factions, the dictator provides ex ante protection by excluding the same officials from investigations. The findings illuminate how authoritarian regimes with similar formal institutions produce divergent anti-corruption outcomes.