The External Debt Situation in Indonesia: Performance and Prospects

Abstract

In interviews with bankers, government economists and academic observers, most of them attributed the absence of an Indonesian debt crisis during 1982–84 to the fact that a significant portion of external public debt, an average of 37 percent, was long‐term concessionary loans from foreign governments and international agencies. Our analysis challenges this conventional explanation. We show that if Indonesia (1) had paid the same effective interest rate as Mexico, (2) had the same maturity structure as Mexican debt, and (3) had the same export‐GNP ratio as Mexico, then its average 1980–82 total debt service‐export ratio would have been 84.4% instead of the actual 30.1%. Our decomposition shows that concessional interest rates account for 5.8 percentage points of the gap, maturity structure for 17.7 percentage points and export orientation for 30.8 percentage points.We have concluded that the major cause for the favorable 1982–84 outcome is competent management of the exchange rate. The absence of protracted exchange rate overvaluation from 1979 onward was fundamental in maintaining a strong nonoil tradeable sector. The nonoil tradeable sector was able to earn enough foreign exchange to service Indonesian debts when the external shock of high interest rates increased debt service payments and the recession in industrialized countries lowered the price of oil. The absence of extended exchange rate overvaluation also kept the external debt down and the maturity structure on the long side by not encouraging capital flight. We ascribe this use of the exchange rate to protect the tradeable sector as much to the existence of an influential political constituency consisting of neoclassical economists, Javanese peasants and Outer Island residents as to balance‐of‐payments considerations.We recommend an aggressive exchange rate policy and two sets of supplementary measures to reduce the probability of a debt crisis in the medium run.