Abstract
Neurointerventions—interventions that physically or chemically modulate brain states—are sometimes imposed on criminal offenders for the purposes of diminishing the risk that they will recidivate, or, more generally, of facilitating their rehabilitation. One objection to the nonconsensual implementation of such interventions holds that this expresses a disrespectful message, and is thus impermissible. In this paper, we respond to this objection, focusing on the most developed version of it—that presented by Elizabeth Shaw. We consider a variety of messages that might be expressed by nonconsensual neurointerventions. Depending on the message, we argue either that such interventions do not invariably express this message, that expressing this message is not invariably disrespectful, or that the appeal to disrespect is redundant.
Highlights
Neurointerventions—interventions that physically or chemically modulate brain states—are sometimes imposed on criminal offenders for the purposes of diminishing the risk that they will recidivate, or, more generally, of facilitating their rehabilitation.1 For example, in several European countries and US states, sex offenders are sometimes required to take hormonal agents that suppress their sex drive, either1 3 Vol.:(0123456789)Criminal Law and Philosophy as part of their initial sentence, or as a condition of early release
To an expressivist argument adverting to the message that the right to bodily integrity (RBI) and right to mental integrity (RMI) have been weakened to the point that it is permissible* to infringe them, we present a dilemma
We suggested that the expressivist argument would be redundant in such cases since its proponent would have to argue that the right is impermissibly* infringed, and that would already constitute a decisive objection to the NN
Summary
Neurointerventions—interventions that physically or chemically modulate brain states—are sometimes imposed on criminal offenders for the purposes of diminishing the risk that they will recidivate, or, more generally, of facilitating their rehabilitation. For example, in several European countries and US states, sex offenders are sometimes required to take hormonal agents that suppress their sex drive, either. There are several strands to Shaw’s critique One of these holds that imposing NNs is, at least in many cases, impermissible by virtue of infringing the offenders’ rights to bodily and/or mental integrity (Shaw 2018a, 2018b, 2019a). I do not claim that the fundamental nature of the rights to bodily/mental integrity on its own (without the element of expressed disrespect) can explain why all mandatory neurointerventions are wrong She does not limit the scope of her objection to cases in which these effects will occur, or can reasonably be expected to occur.11 She appears to believe that expressing a negative misrepresentation about someone, through administering an NN, is wrong even in the absence of (an expectation of) harm. Broadening the scope of disrespectful behavior allows us to consider some actions whose meaning may not be about the subject’s value (see Sect. 2). 11 See, for instance, her discussion of the corpse desecrator (Shaw 2018a, p. 326)
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