Abstract
Abstract On the view that I will be calling ‘common sense realism’, conscious experiences have a critical causal role in explaining action. On this view, because of the way a pain feels to me, subjectively, I take steps to stop it; or because a cake seems, phenomenally, to be on my left, I reach out in that direction. During the past two decades, this fundamental ingredient in our everyday psychology has been put under severe pressure, both by philosophers and by psychologists, who for a variety of reasons have claimed that phenomenal consciousness is causally epiphenomenal; it has no causal role at all. To put it very crudely—as far as the causal workings of our minds are concerned, we might as well be zombies.
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