The Explanation Proffering Norm of Moral Assertion

Mona Simion

doi:10.1007/s10677-018-9922-6

Abstract

In recent years, much attention has been given to the epistemic credentials of belief based on moral testimony. Some people think pure moral deference is wrong, others disagree. It comes as a surprise, however, that while the epistemic responsibilities of the receiver of moral testimony have been closely scrutinized, little to no discussion has focused on the epistemic duties of the speaker. This paper aims to supply this lack: it defends a function-first account of the normativity of moral assertion. According to this view, in virtue of its function of reliably generating understanding in the audience, a moral assertion that p needs be knowledgeable and accompanied by a contextually appropriate explanation why p.

Highlights

Several people think knowledge is the norm of assertion: one should only assert that p if one knows that p (KNA)
This paper aims to supply this lack: it looks into the prospects of a function-first account of the normativity of moral assertion, where the norm at stake is taken to drop right out of the function of moral assertion in testimonial exchanges
I have been arguing that, if it is plausible to think that knowledge is the norm of assertion in general, in virtue of assertion’s function of generating knowledge in hearers, since in the case of moral assertion, the epistemic function at stake is moral understanding, the norm governing assertion will be something in the vicinity of Explanation Proffering Norm of Moral Assertion (EPNMA)*

Summary

Introduction

Several people think knowledge is the norm of assertion: one should only assert that p if one knows that p (KNA). Others disagree and impose weaker conditions (justification, truth), or stronger conditions (certainty), or even contextually variant conditions on permissible assertion.. Others disagree and impose weaker conditions (justification, truth), or stronger conditions (certainty), or even contextually variant conditions on permissible assertion.2 Whatever their preferred norm might be, most people in the debate agree upon one broadly Gricean thought: it should be able to account for assertion’s epistemic aim, or function.. I argue that the norm of moral assertion borne out by this framework is one that requires speakers to (1) know the contents of their assertion and (2) back their assertion with a contextually appropriate explanation To this aim, I first look at the broad lines employed in the literature to derive the norm of assertion from its epistemic function; in particular, I look at the case for the knowledge norm (#2).

The Norm and Function of Assertion

Testimony and Moral Understanding

The Function and Norm of Moral Assertion

A Few Worries

Conclusion