Abstract

According to the experience property framework qualia are properties of experiences the subject undergoing the experience is aware of. A phenomenological argument against this framework is developed and a few mistakes invited by the framework (concerning our understanding of consciousness, self-consciousness and the relation of the two) are described. An alternative to the framework, the framework of experiential properties (where experiential properties are properties of the experiencing subject) is presented and defended as preferable. It is argued that the choice between these two frameworks makes a substantial difference for theoretical purposes.

Highlights

  • The fact that there is something that it is like for the experiencing subject to undergo an experience is commonly expressed by saying that experiences have qualitative character

  • The examples given in the preceding sections illustrate that the experience property framework and the framework of experiential properties are not just two variants of one and the same theoretical language

  • 16 Nida-Rümelin (2006) and Goff (2011) both argue for the following claim: to have an experienced-based concept of an experiential property allows the subject at issue to grasp what having the relevant property consists in (this is the thesis called phenomenal essentialism in Nida-Rümelin (2006), phenomenal concepts are, according to this claim nature-revealing, they are transparent in the terminology of Philip Goff)

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Summary

Introduction

The fact that there is something that it is like for the experiencing subject to undergo an experience is commonly expressed by saying that experiences have qualitative character. This is usually taken to imply that experiences have properties, so-called qualia, which constitute what it is like to undergo the experience at issue This common framework, the experience property framework, will be challenged in the present paper. It is a mistake, or so I will argue, to approach philosophical issues about consciousness within this established paradigm. Philosophical issues about consciousness should be approached by focussing on experiential properties and the status of those who can have them: experiencing subjects This framework, the framework of experiential properties, should be chosen in order to avoid mistakes that are invited by the experience property framework, or so I will argue in the present paper. There is good reason to abandon the experience property framework in favour the framework of experiential properties, or so I will argue.

Experiences and experiential properties
A fallacious argument in favour of the experience property framework
Immediate awareness in the sense of phenomenal presence
Immediate awareness in the sense of perceptual awareness
Immediate awareness in the sense of primitive awareness
An account of primitive awareness
Candidates for properties fulfilling Q1 and Q2
10 RE is not phenomenally presented
11 We are not perceptually aware of RE
12 Primitive awareness does not help
13 Experiences and brain processes
14 Supposed qualia of brain processes
15 Confusing different kinds of acquaintance
16 Phenomenal consciousness and self-awareness
17 Higher order theories of consciousness
18 Transparency and attending to phenomenal character
20 Concluding remark
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