Abstract
In this study we investigated how the excluded player's payoff in coalition formation affects coalition behavior. Results of two experiments showed that a decrease in excluded player's payoff decreased the number of proposed small coalitions. This effect was moderated by social value orientations. Prosocials decreased their preference for being members of a small coalition when the excluded player's payoff decreased. Proselfs preferred being members of small coalitions regardless of the excluded player's payoff. These results provided a different perspective than previous research that generally focused on the members of a coalition, and assumed that coalition is foremost a game in which players wants to maximize their own outcome. Results are discussed and related to research on social exclusion, the do-no-harm principle, and social value orientations.
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