Abstract
Aiming at exploring the interplay principles of operations strategies among members of dvertising and emission reduction cost sharing contracts and coordination in low-carbon sulow-carbon supply chain, as well as their impact on system performance, we develop an evolutionary game model to capture emission reduction and low-carbon promotion actions, which are typically conducted by one manufacturer and one retailer in every two-echelon supply chain, respectively. We exploit the evolutionary game model to analyze players’ behavioral patterns of their interacting strategies, whereby we attain the evolutionary stable strategies and their associated existing preconditions under various scenarios. We acquire a number of managerial insights, and particularly find that the evolutionary stable strategies of the channel carbon reduction and promotion are remarkably influenced by incremental profits resulted from causes, such as every player’s unilateral participation in emission reduction. In addition, we investigate a player’s free-rider opportunistic practice in cooperative carbon reduction and joint participation in emission reduction. However, the magnitude of profit increment will heavily influence the result of Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS). Finally, the extensive computational studies enable us to verify the effectiveness of preceding models.
Highlights
The dramatically rapid development of the global economy has incurred a large amount of carbon emission over the world, which causes some challenging environmental and climate issues
Evolutionary game is widely used in the field of biology and economics, few researches considered the free riding problem within the vertical cooperation of carbon emission reduction. Taking aim at this gap, we strive to focus on three research questions, as follows: (1) What is the evolutionary trend of carbon emission reduction under long-term cooperation in supply chains? (2) What affects evolutionary stable strategy of carbon emission reduction in a long-term cooperative supply chains?
Different from previous literature, we focus on cooperative carbon emission reduction coupled with the low-carbon promotion, from the viewpoint of evolutionary game theoretic analysis
Summary
The dramatically rapid development of the global economy has incurred a large amount of carbon emission over the world, which causes some challenging environmental and climate issues. One of our main objectives is to explore whether free riding behavior has impacts on the cooperation strategy of emission reduction among vertical supply chain cooperation in the long term. We attempt to conduct evolutionary game theoretic analysis for the supply chain while considering the behaviors of emission reduction, low-carbon promotion, and free riding in the long-term cooperation. Taking aim at this gap, we strive to focus on three research questions, as follows: (1) What is the evolutionary trend of carbon emission reduction under long-term cooperation in supply chains? (3) What is the impact of the free-riding behavior on vertical cooperative strategy of emission reduction for supply chain enterprises in the long term?
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