The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Multiple Stakeholders in the Low-Carbon Agricultural Innovation Diffusion

Lixia Liu,Shubing Guo,Yuchao Zhu

doi:10.1155/2020/6309545

Lixia Liu, Shubing Guo + Show 1 more

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.1155/2020/6309545

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Journal: Complexity	Publication Date: Feb 22, 2020
Citations: 26	License type: CC BY 4.0

Affiliation: Tianjin University, Tianjin University of Commerce

Abstract

Encouraging the adoption and diffusion of low-carbon agricultural technology innovation is an important measure to cope with climate change, reduce environmental pollution, and achieve sustainable agricultural development. Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper establishes a game model among agricultural enterprises, government, and farmers and analyzes the dynamic evolutionary process and evolutionary stable strategies of the major stakeholders. The impact of innovation subsidies, carbon taxes, and adoption subsidies on low-carbon agricultural innovation diffusion is simulated using Matlab software. The results show that the government’s reasonable subsidies and carbon taxes for agricultural enterprises and farmers can increase the enthusiasm of agricultural enterprises and farmers to participate in low-carbon agriculture. This study can be used as a basis for the government to formulate more targeted policies to promote the diffusion of low-carbon agricultural innovation.

Highlights

With the rapid development of the global economy, global warming has become an issue of great concern to the international community
Developing low-carbon agriculture is an inevitable choice to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, improve agricultural ecological environment, and realize agricultural modernization. e innovation and diffusion of low-carbon agricultural technologies cannot be separated from the participation of relevant stakeholders such as agricultural enterprises, government, farmers, and intermediaries
Different from previous studies, this paper establishes a tripartite game model involving agricultural enterprises, government, and farmers using evolutionary game theory. en, simulation analysis based on MATLAB software is implemented to explore the impact of government policies on the innovation diffusion of low-carbon agriculture. e results show that

Summary

Introduction

With the rapid development of the global economy, global warming has become an issue of great concern to the international community. Promotion, and application of low-carbon agricultural technologies are the key measures to achieve carbon sequestration and emission reduction in agricultural production [6]. Many countries have adopted policies to stimulate the innovation and diffusion of low-carbon agricultural technologies, such as subsidies, tax incentives, and public loans [7,8,9,10,11,12]. Different from the existing literature, we analyze the diffusion of low-carbon agricultural innovation based on evolutionary game theory. En, we use the numerical simulation method to examine the dynamic evolution path of the game system and to analyze the impact of low-carbon policies on the behavior of agricultural enterprises, government, and farmers.

Literature Review

Problem Description and Assumptions

The Evolutionary Game Model Solution and Analysis

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Conclusions and Suggestions