Abstract
The state of affairs regarding U.S. grand strategy since 9/11 raises three key questions: Can lessons be drawn from classical counterinsurgency (COIN) that could be used in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Can insurgencies in places such as Iraq, Chechnya, Mindanao, Kashmir, Somalia, and Afghanistan be treated as part of this global insurgency? Should the global threat from Al Qaeda’s violent jihadist ideology mean that it should be treated as a global insurgency, with the logical strategy to counter it being a strategy of global counterinsurgency (GCOIN)?KeywordsTerrorist AttackSecurity ForceGrand StrategyGlobal TerrorismInternational Security Assistance ForceThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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