The evolution of the U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy in the 1970s

Abstract

This paper examines (1) how the Ford Administration tried to persuade South Korea to give up obtaining the spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plant and their related technologies, which were one of the most sensitive among peaceful nuclear use, and (2) how the Carter Administration solved the dispute with Japan over the operation of its first reprocessing plant in Tokai-Mura. The Ford Administration found the multinational reprocessing concept as a solution to persuade South Korea to forgo its possession of reprocessing plant. In this concept, the multinational reprocessing plant was supposed to be established in territories of a more reliable nation, while the neighboring nations in sensitive areas were to be allowed to access that facility and gain the benefits in exchange for giving up its own reprocessing. The Ford administration tried to get the Japanese help to realize this concept. In the end, South Korea abandoned its reprocessing option because of the U.S. intimidation that the acquisition of reprocessing plant could have a negative impact on the U.S.-Korean bilateral security partnership. The Carter Administration, on the other hand, considered a reprocessing option uneconomic and even universally harmful in terms of proliferation risk, and so it called for a stronger effort to stop the spread of reprocessing plants. As such, the Carter Administration itself abandoned the reprocessing option domestically, while requesting the Japanese to reconsider the operation of the Tokai-Mura plant in attempt to demonstrate that it would seek the universal goal. Thus although the Carter Administration ended up giving concession to the Japanese government, the agreement was made on the condition that Japan's first reprocessing plant was to be operated on experimental basis for the first two years to obtain the technical data for the creation of the international regime to prevent the spread of sensitive technologies.