Abstract

When humans fail to make optimal decisions in strategic games and economic gambles, researchers typically try to explain why that behaviour is biased. To this end, they search for mechanisms that cause human behaviour to deviate from what seems to be the rational optimum. But perhaps human behaviour is not biased; perhaps research assumptions about the optimality of strategies are incomplete. In the one-shot anonymous symmetric ultimatum game (UG), humans fail to play optimally as defined by the Nash equilibrium. However, the distinction between kin and non-kin—with kin detection being a key evolutionary adaption—is often neglected when deriving the “optimal” strategy. We computationally evolved strategies in the UG that were equipped with an evolvable probability to discern kin from non-kin. When an opponent was not kin, agents evolved strategies that were similar to those used by humans. We therefore conclude that the strategy humans play is not irrational. The deviation between behaviour and the Nash equilibrium may rather be attributable to key evolutionary adaptations, such as kin detection. Our findings further suggest that social preference models are likely to capture mechanisms that permit people to play optimally in an evolutionary context. Once this context is taken into account, human behaviour no longer appears irrational.

Highlights

  • When humans fail to make optimal decisions in strategic games and economic gambles, researchers typically try to explain why that behaviour is biased

  • The deviation between behaviour and the Nash equilibrium may rather be attributable to key evolutionary adaptations, such as kin detection

  • In the ultimatum game (UG) players either make an offer or accept/reject an offer made by the other player, and it is these values that we evolved in the computational model

Read more

Summary

Introduction

When humans fail to make optimal decisions in strategic games and economic gambles, researchers typically try to explain why that behaviour is biased. In the one-shot anonymous symmetric ultimatum game (UG), humans fail to play optimally as defined by the Nash equilibrium. Our findings further suggest that social preference models are likely to capture mechanisms that permit people to play optimally in an evolutionary context. Once this context is taken into account, human behaviour no longer appears irrational. The study of the one-shot anonymous ultimatum game (UG) has helped researchers to understand what influence social preferences[1] have on human choice In this game, two players—a proposer and a responder—are tasked with an economic decision[2]. Much as an organism does not interact with all other possible organisms, but only with those alive at the time

Objectives
Methods
Results
Conclusion
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call