The evolution of cooperation in spatial groups

Abstract

Much of human cooperation remains an evolutionary riddle. There is evidence that individuals are often organized into groups in many social situations. Inspired by this observation, we propose a simple model of evolutionary public goods games in which individuals are organized into networked groups. Here, nodes in the network represent groups; the edges, connecting the nodes, refer to the interactions between the groups. Individuals establish public goods games with partners in the same group and migrate among neighboring groups depending on their payoffs and expectations. We show that the paradigmatic public goods social dilemma can be resolved and high cooperation levels are attained in structured groups, even in relatively harsh conditions for cooperation. Further, by means of numerical simulations and mean-field analysis, we arrive at the result: larger average group size and milder cooperation environment would lead to lower cooperation level but higher average payoffs of the entire population. Altogether, these results emphasize that our understanding of cooperation can be enhanced by investigations of how spatial groups of individuals affect the evolution dynamics, which might help in explaining the emergence and evolution of cooperation.