Abstract

Looking at four moments of internal ‘crisis’ for the European Union (EU), the attempt to revise the Common European Asylum System (2016–), the EU-Turkey deal (2016), increased cooperation with Libya (2017), and the EU’s non-contribution (from a formal point of view) to the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (2016–2018) this chapter aims at uncovering how struggles between EU institutions and Member States played a prominent role in the final ability to respond, and in the type of response provided. At all these critical moments, the copious arrivals of migrants acted as detonators, and solicited interaction has unleashed quite opposite behaviours: in two cases (the EU-Turkey deal and the agreement with Libya) internal quarrels have led to the EU’s action in the direction of externalization. In the remaining cases, (the attempt to revise the asylum system and its would-be participation in the Global Compact) frictions have paralysed the EU. Using the categories of non-domination, impartiality and mutual recognition this chapter also assesses the normative prioritizations these interactions have yielded and their consequences. Rather than simply following on from the values and principles it supports, the message the EU conveys to the external world about what is just on migration and asylum largely derives from the articulation and accommodation of its inherent and equally legitimate stakes, that is, its own preservation and the promotion of human rights.

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