The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe by Frank Schimmelfennig, and: Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU's Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe: The Myth of Conditionality by James Hughes and Gwendolyn Sasse (review)

Abstract

784 SEER, 84, 4, 2oo6 Schimmelfennig, Frank and Sedelmeier Ulrich (eds). 7The Europeanization of Central andEastern Europe. Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY and London, 2005. x + 256 pp. Tables. Notes. Bibliography.Index. $22.50: f12.50 (paperback). Hughes, James, Sasse, Gwendolyn and Gordon, Claire. Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU's Enlargement to Central and EasternEurope:The Myth of Conditionaliy. One Europe or Several? Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstokeand New York, 2004. xiv + 23I pp. Maps. Figures.Tables. Notes. Bibliography.Appendix. Index. f48.oo. To what extent has the European Union caused changes in Central and EasternEurope (CEE)in the past decade and a half?Some of the more sinmplistic accounts from the extremistwing of the Europeanizationbrigade have tended to view the CEE states as little more than passive recipients duly implementing the dictates of Brussels.The reality, however, has been very different.Thanks to a number of superb studiespublished recently including Milada Anna Vachudova'sEurope Undivided (Oxford,2005) and WadeJacoby's Orderingfrom theMenu(Cambridge,2004) we now have a much more sophisticated understanding of when, why and how the EU shaped, directed and occasionally determined change in CEE. Both Hughes et al.'s Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU's Enlargement to Centraland EasternEuropeand Schimmelfennigand Sedelmeier'sexcellent edited volume, TheEuropeanization of Central andEastern Europe, contribute to this burgeoning body of literature, but in very different ways. Whereas the former is a highly detailed study of one policy area, the latter is a collection of theoreticallyinformed essays exploring a range of policy areas and countries. In order to assess the impact of the EU, Schimmelfennigand Sedelmeier suggest three models: lesson-drawing,social learning and external incentives. According to the lesson drawing model states adopt EU rules because they 'judge them as effective remedies to inherently domestic needs and policy challenges, rather than out of considerations about the incentives the EU might offer for rule adoption' (p. io). Social learning, in contrast,is linked in with notions of identity,proposingthat rule adoption is more likelywhere the target government and society identify with the organization which established the rules. The external incentivesmodel, however, is based on a hardheaded calculation:a government will adopt EU rules if the benefits of the rewards granted by the EU exceed the domestic adoption costs. Although acknowledgingthe utility of the first two of these models, particularlyin t;he early I99OS before membershipwas on the EU's agenda, the contributorsto The Europeanization of Central and EasternEuropefind the external incentives model to be the most helpful explanatoryframework. Schimmelfenning et al., however, also develop the external incentives model. As they correctlyassert,the potency of externalincentivesdepends on a number of factors.Chief among these are the clarityof the ruleswhich need to be adhered to, the credibilityof the organizationissuingthe demands, the size and speed of reformsand the existence of domestic veto players. As the I99OS progressed the EU increasinglyclarified its requirementsof countries that wished to join. Initially states were asked to meet the Copenhagen criteria,but these ratherbroad demands were then fleshed out at the Madrid REVIEWS 785 European Council in I995 and in the numerousCommission reportscharting the aspirantstates'progress(or lack of). More critically, however, what mattered was the credibility of the EU's offer of membership. The Luxembourg European Council in 1997 passed judgment on the former Communist states of CEE. Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and the Czech Republic were deemed to have met the criteria and were invited to begin accession negotiations.This willingnessto open the negotiation doors, therefore,seemed to demonstratethat the EU's offerof membershipwas genuine which provided a clear signal for those left out that enacting the changes requiredby the EU could yield the much sought after reward. As Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel's chapter argues, however, 'even if credibilityis high, rule adoption will depend on the size of governmental adoption costs' (p.33). Slovakia under the leadership of Vladimir Meciar provides the clearestexample illustratingthis point. Despite the huge potential benefits of joining the club and the government'sstated declaration of joining the EU, the I994-98 government was not willing to make the necessarysacrifices.The domestic adaptationcosts were too high. Nevertheless,Schimmelfenninget al. demonstratethat the EU could bring about changes even in...