Abstract
The European Semester is a challenge for national parliaments but also an opportunity to reform domestic oversight institutions. Drawing on data from all member states, this study examines the conditions under which national parliaments use this opportunity. Is Euro area membership a prerequisite for parliamentary adaptation to the European Semester and, if so, which further combinations of conditions account for variation among Euro area countries? The analysis suggests that membership in or close ties with the Euro area and institutional strength constitute <em>necessary conditions</em> for parliamentary adaptation. Combined with other factors—in particular, public debt exceeding the Maastricht criteria—these conditions explain reform in many cases. National parliamentary adaptation to the European Semester thus follows existing institutional divisions constituted by differentiated integration in the Euro area and uneven national parliamentary strength.
Highlights
The European Semester is the process through which the EU seeks to ensure member state compliance with its macroeconomic and fiscal rules
This study examines whether national parliaments adapt to the European Semester by reforming domestic over‐ sight institutions, defined as rights and procedures to scrutinize the government during the Semester process
The goal of this study has been to examine whether national parliaments address these concerns by adopt‐ ing Semester‐specific reforms of their domestic oversight procedures and rights
Summary
The European Semester is the process through which the EU seeks to ensure member state compliance with its macroeconomic and fiscal rules. It has been argued that national parlia‐ ments should prioritize attention to EU economic gover‐ nance (de Wilde & Raunio, 2018) Against this backdrop, this study examines whether national parliaments adapt to the European Semester by reforming domestic over‐ sight institutions, defined as rights and procedures to scrutinize the government during the Semester process. Institutional strengths—defined by pre‐existing institu‐ tional rights in EU or budgetary matters—is another necessary condition These two explanations, combined with a range of other factors, form several sufficient configurations of conditions for reform. If input legitimacy is understood in terms of parliamen‐ tary oversight institutions, a key conclusion is that there is cross‐national variation in the input legitimacy of the European Semester This variation reflects broader insti‐ tutional differences constituted by uneven parliamen‐ tary strength and differentiated integration. The con‐ clusion further highlights different perspectives on the implications of this finding
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