The European Parliament's strategy in EU economic and financial reform

Abstract

ABSTRACTThis article investigates the bargaining strategy of the European Parliament (EP) as a co-legislator in the field of economic and financial governance on the basis of two prominent case studies – the legislative packages for financial supervision and economic governance. It analyses the impact the internal cohesion of the EP had on its bargaining strategy in informal trilogue negotiations with the Council and the Commission at first reading. The article argues that the degree of internal cohesion had a very limited impact on the EP's external bargaining strategy in the trilogues. This is visible both in the substance of the EP position – the issues the EP chose to promote – as well as in the form – the negotiation tactics. Thus, while the internal functioning of the EP is increasingly dominated by ideological and majoritarian features, externally the EP insists on promoting issues where a strong consensus exists to maximize its bargaining power.