Abstract
When the Lisbon Treaty entered into effect, the European Parliament became a core player in the decision-making processes of the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and its external dimensions. This new role suggested a shift towards stronger politicization in what had previously been a rather technocratic policy field. However, the CFP is not yet marked by a clear and consistent level of politicization. I use the concept of ‘layered politicization’ to explain this pattern. Although it is not comparable to the degree of political controversy shaping fully politicized policy fields, some similar political dynamics can be observed. Among them is a transformation in the policy process due to higher ratification requirements; a higher likelihood of political deadlock resulting from an increasing number of veto-players; and a strengthening of the contested legitimacy of EU decision-making. An empirical test of these theoretical propositions is provided here in the form of two case studies; the negotiation of Fisheries Partnership Agreements with Morocco and Mauritania.
Highlights
Research on the EU’s foreign economic policies has long focused mainly on the impact of the principal-agent dynamics between the European Commission (EC) and the Council, the influence of commercial lobby groups, and the efficiency of EU negotiating strategies
As detailed in this special issue, the burgeoning power of the European Parliament (EP) over the past decade has significantly extended the potential for societal contestation, far beyond the situation which existed when the Council and the EC still reigned supreme in foreign economic policy
The EP has become a focal point for research on this phenomenon, which is usually described as a process of politicization of EU politics
Summary
Research on the EU’s foreign economic policies has long focused mainly on the impact of the principal-agent dynamics between the European Commission (EC) and the Council, the influence of commercial lobby groups, and the efficiency of EU negotiating strategies. A number of scenarios can give rise to politicization These include civil society groups and (often forgotten) commercial groups vigorously taking up a particular topic in an attempt to win strong public attention; political parties making the issue part of their platforms It is possible that some aspects of an issue are contested strongly (see the investorstate dispute settlement in TTIP), whereas the bulk of it is still dealt with behind closed doors Such an uneven pattern of politicization seems to characterize the CFP and its external dimensions. The more problematic consequences of politicization include less efficient policy-making in terms of output, with a significantly higher rate of ratification failures (Hooghe & Marks, 2009) Can these effects be observed in a (partially) politicized CFP?
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