The European Parliament and economic governance: explaining a case of limited influence

Abstract

ABSTRACTThis article studies the influence of the European Parliament (EP) in the reform of the EU’s economic governance. Descriptively, it aims to provide a systematic map of the negotiations of the Six- and the Two-Pack legislation, focusing on the key controversies between the co-legislators, and comparing the position of the EP with the Commission’s legislative proposals, the Council position and the final legislative output. The surprisingly limited influence of the EP – given its formal powers and the assessment made by most scholars – is then assessed through rational choice and sociological institutionalist perspectives. While the more favourable BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement) of the Council could explain the outcome of the Two-Pack, and a norm of responsibility triggered by the crisis could account for the limited impact of the EP on the Six-Pack, the authors advance a different explanation. They suggest that in policy areas close to ‘core state powers’, such as budgetary surveillance, the member states still have a primary role to play. Despite the extension of codecision, the EP is expected to act within the boundaries that member states define. The authors’ policy-based explanation adds a new perspective on the study of the EP’s influence on EU law-making.