The European Investor State has no clothes. Generic promises and local weaknesses of green public subsidies in France

Abstract

This article concentrates on the funding of green transition policies implemented in France during the 2010s. Instead of examining the emerging European Investor State through its “new” public investment policies, such as loans, equity, investment banks, and funds, this article examines the transformations of “older” public investment policies, specifically investment subsidies. We contend that the European Investor State is currently marked by a paradox: while public resources for investment, particularly for green transition investments, are increasing, the means to distribute these resources are diminishing. Austerity measures and new public management policies are undermining territorial administrations, thereby limiting their ability to accurately identify and support beneficiaries. This bureaucratic weakness within the European Investor State significantly affects the effective distribution of subsidies, because they tend to be increasingly concentrated among larger communities and companies, as well as a broad spectrum of private intermediaries. Consequently, the European Investor State appears multifaceted and occasionally contradictory, lacking long-term continuity.