Abstract
ABSTRACT The European Investment Bank (EIB) was officially part of a coordinated European Union (EU) strategy to address the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, we argue that despite the worst socio-economic crisis to hit most European countries since the Second World War, the EIB failed to deviate from a set path that delimited acceptable forms of lending. We apply a historical institutionalist analysis to explain how and why the EIB continued to engage in principally low risk lending activities via the commercial banking sector, and failed to significantly increase lending to the public health sector.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
